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THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA, LAW, AND NATIONAL RESOLVE IN
THE WAR ON TERROR
ROBERT HARDAWAY*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the govern-
ment of the United States took unprecedented steps to protect American lives and
property.' Measures imposed included tightened security at nuclear power plants,2
airports,3 and numerous other government and private installations around the
United States.4
Debate over an appropriate U.S. response centered on whether there was
proof of a foreign state's complicity in the attacks. On September 15, 2001, a New
York Times/CBS News poll revealed that eighty-five percent of Americans would
Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law.
1. See, e.g., Michael R. Gordon, After the Attacks: An Assessment, U.S. Force vs, Terrorists:
From Reactive to Active, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2001, at A16. ("The analogy between this week's ter-
rorist attacks and Pearl Harbor is apt in one sense. The attacks have shaken the American public and the
Pentagon leadership. Strategies and tactics that seemed unthinkable just weeks ago are thinkable
now.").
2. See AAP Information Services, Bush Administration Orders Tighter Nuclear Plant Security,
Feb. 15, 2002, available at 2002 WL 5749902 (declaring that the Bush administration "ordered all 103
U.S. nuclear power plants to tighten anti-terrorism measures" as evidence of "the Federal Aviation ad-
ministration banning flights within 19 km of most U.S. nuclear plants."). See also Raymond McCaffrey
& Monte Reel, Terror Attacks' Fallout Reaches Southern Md.; Security Alerts, Road Snarls, Grief Grip
Counties, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2001, at TI (stating that security increased drastically at the Calvert
Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant in Lusby, Maryland as a result of the terrorist attacks). See also Mark Bara-
bak & Beth Shuster, America Attacked, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at A29 ("As the first reports of ter-
ror arrived from the East early Tuesday, the California Highway Patrol scrambled its aircraft to secure
the skies above the state Capital, the California Aqueduct, and state's electricity grid, nuclear power
plants, and other critical locations.").
3. See Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (allowing the
federal government to have control of the security of airports) ("The Under Secretary shall (1) be re-
sponsible for day-to-day Federal security screening operations for passenger air transportation and in-
trastate air transportation under sections 44901 and 44935; (2) develop standards for the hiring and re-
tention of security screening personnel; (3) train and test security screening personnel; and (4) be
responsible for hiring and training personnel to provide security screening at all airports in the United
States where screening is required under section 44901, in consultation with the Secretary of Transpor-
tation and the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies and departments.") Id. § 101 (e).
4. Press release, Office of the Press Secretary, White House, Strengthening Homeland Security
Since 9/11 (Apr. 11, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/six-month.update.html.
(discussing measures to increase safety in response to the September 11, 2001, including the establish-
ment of terrorism task forces, increased border patrols and INS regulations, increased screening at air-
ports and employee background checks, increased funding to eliminate viruses and possible chemical
weapon attacks, increased security at major dams, reservoirs, and nuclear power plants, and the institu-
tion of more civic groups to aid with community protection).
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support military action against whoever was responsible for the attacks, while only
six percent would oppose any military retaliation. 5 To a large degree, therefore,
the debate over U.S. policy in Iraq may be reduced to the simple question of
whether Iraq was in fact involved in the 9/11 attacks.
While official investigations were immediately begun, it was not until May 7,
2003, that a federal court, considering all the evidence and applying the strict Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence (F.R.E.), made specific findings that Iraq, Saddam Hus-
sein, and al Qaeda were jointly responsible for the 9/11 attacks. 6 In Smith v. Is-
lamic Emirate of Afghanistan,7 families of 9/11 victims brought a tort case against
Hussein and the Republic of Iraq pursuant to the Antiterrorism Act of 1991, which
specifically provides that victims of terrorism may sue for damages in an appropri-
ate federal district court.
8
Since neither Iraq nor Hussein appeared in court to defend the allegations and
thus, failed to provide discovery materials required, the plaintiffs argued that a
lower standard of evidentiary proof should be imposed in establishing Iraq's com-
plicity in 9/11. 9 However, the Court rejected this argument, citing 28 U.S.C.
1608(e), which states that no judgment by default may be entered against a foreign
state unless the "claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence satis-
factory to the court."'0
In other words, the court insisted that, even though neither Iraq nor Hussein
appeared, the plaintiffs would nevertheless have to submit evidence sufficient to
meet the higher burden of proof required by the statute despite having been disad-
vantaged by lack of access to discovery." Even more disadvantageous to the
plaintiffs, the court ruled that strict rules of evidence, including the very technical
hearsay rules imposed by the F.R.E, would have to be strictly complied with in
presenting the plaintiffs case.12
At the evidentiary hearing, Robert Woolsey, CIA Director under President
Clinton, testified that according to information available, "I believe it definitely
more likely than not that some degree of common effort in the sense of aiding and
abetting or conspiracy was involved here between Iraq and al Qaeda. ,13
5. CBS News.com, Poll: Revenge and Return (Sept. 15, 2001), available at
http://cbsnews.com/stories/2001/09/15/opinion/main311417.shtml.
6. Smith v. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 262 F. Supp. 2d 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
7. Id.
8. Anti-Terrorism Act of 1991 § 2333, 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (2005)
9. Smith, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 222-23.
10. Id. at 222-24 (emphasis added); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (2004) ("No judgment by default
shall be entered by a court of the United States or of a State against a foreign state, a political subdivi-
sion thereof, or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state, unless the claimant establishes his claim
or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court. A copy of any such default judgment shall be sent
to the foreign state or political subdivision in the manner prescribed for service in this section.")
11. Smith, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 224-25.
12. Id. at 223.
13. Id. at 232 (emphasis added); see also generally, Interview by PBS Frontline with R. James
Woolsey, attorney and former Director of the CIA, (Oct. 2001), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/gunning/interviews/woolsey.html.
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Expert on Iraq and a former Clinton advisor, Dr. Laurie Mylroie of Harvard,
after examining the evidence concluded that, "Iraq... provide[d] support and re-
sources for the September 11 attacks... al Qaeda acts as a front for Iraqi intelli-
gence. Al Qaeda provides the ideology, the foot soldiers, and the cover.. . [a]nd
Iraq provides the direction, the training, and the expertise." 14
In a previous study, Dr. Mylroie noted that Iraq had made little effort to hide
its intent to attack the United States;1 5 she cited the following threats published by
Iraq in its official news organ prior to the events of 9/11:
1. Does the United States realize the meaning of every Iraqi becoming a mis-
sile that can cross countries and cities.
16
2. The crime of annihilating the Iraqis will trigger crises whose nature and
consequences are known only to God.17
3. When one realizes that death is one's inexorable fate, there remains nothing
to deter one from taking the most risky steps to influence the course of events. 8
4. When peoples reach the verge of collective death, they will be able to
spread death to all.19
Similar direct threats of violence against the United States were published by
Iraq on an almost daily basis.2 °
However, the court declared certain items of otherwise persuasive evidence of
Iraqi complicity in the 9/11 inadmissible on narrow technical grounds under the
F.R.E. 21 Thus, the court did not consider a compendium of evidence presented,
including a litany of contacts between al Qaeda and Iraqi intelligence, as well as
the testimony of defectors concerning Hussein's training camp for al Qaeda terror-
ists at Salman Pak in Iraq (which included among other props, a full-scale mock up
of an airliner with no runway nearby).22 Other evidence presented, but excluded
14. Smith, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 229.
15. Laurie Mylroie, The World Trade Center Bomb: Who is Ramzi YouseJ? And Why it Matters,
NAT'L INT., Winter 1995/1996, at 12-14.
16. Id. at 12, (quoting Babil, the official Iraqi newspaper, Sept. 29, 1994).
17. Id. at 13 (citing al- Jumhuriyah, an Iraqi daily newspaper Oct. 8 1994).
18. Id. (quoting al- Jumhuriyah, Oct. 5, 1994).
19. Id. at 12 (quoting al- Jumhuriyah, Oct. 4 1994).
20. Id.
21. Smith, 262 F. Supp. 2d, at 224-25.
22. For a review of the evidence presented, see id. at 228-32.
Dr. Laurie Mylroie, an expert on Iraq and its involvement.., in the bombing of the World
Trade Center in 1993 ... described Iraq's covert involvement in acts of terrorism against
the United States in the past, including the bombing of he World Trade Center in 1993. Dr.
Mylroie testified to at least four events that served as the basis for her conclusion that Iraq
played a role in the September 11 tragedy .... Specifically, Abdul Rashman Yasin re-
turned to Baghdad after the bombing and Iraq has provided him safe haven ever since.
Also, Ramsey Yusef arrived in the United States on an Iraqi passport in his own name but
left on false documentation-a passport of a Pakistani who was living and Kuwait and
whom the Kuwaiti government kept on file on at the time that Iraq invaded Kuwait. Sec-
ond, she noted bin Laden's fatwah against the U.S., which was motivated by the presence
of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia to fight the Gulf War against Iraq. Third, she noted that
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by the court, included an assertion in an official Iraqi newspaper in July 2001, just
two months before the 9/11 attacks, that "bin Laden will try to bomb the Pentagon
after he destroys the White House. '23 It is widely believed that the intended target
of the hijacked airliner which crashed in Pennsylvania was the White House.24
Even after throwing out this mass of evidence, the court concluded on the ba-
sis of the remaining evidence, and pursuant to the legal standard of "evidence satis-
factory to the court," that "Iraq provided material support to bin Laden and al
Qaeda.,,25 A judgment in the amount of sixty million dollars was entered against
Hussein and Iraq for its involvement in the 9/11 attacks.26
One interesting question is why there has been so little media coverage of this
very important federal case. One possible, though perhaps unduly cynical, explana-
tion is that those who seek peace at any price are not eager for the public to be-
come aware of a specific U.S. federal court finding that Iraq was involved in 9/11
for fear that it might strengthen national resolve to support U.S. policy in Iraq and
to enforce U.N. resolutions.
Although President Bush's reticence to rely on court precedent and evidence
of Iraq's complicity has been severely criticized,27 it is perhaps understandable in
light of virulent anti-war skepticism, such as in France where a best-selling book
asserts that no airliner ever attacked the Pentagon and that Bush and the Jews mas-
terminded 9/11.28 No amount of evidence is ever likely to convince those who op-
threats by bin Laden in late 1997 and early 1998 which led up to the bombing of the U.S.
embassies (on August 7, 1998) were "in lockstep" with Hussein's threats about ousting the
U.N. weapons inspectors .... Id. at 228-29.
23. Id. at 231.
24. Id. at 231 n.23.
25. Id. at 232; see also Richard Willing, Lawsuit Ruling Finds Iraq Partly Responsible for 9/11,
USA TODAY, May 7, 2003, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2003-05-07-91 I-judge-
awardsx.htm; Douglas lehl, More Proof of Iraq-Qaeda Link, or Not?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2003, at
A18. An Oct. 27, 2003 memorandum from Pentagon official Douglas J. Feith outlined "50 points of
raw intelligence" between Iraq and Al Qaeda. The memo supports Bush administration officials' argu-
ments that former ties between Al Qaeda and Iraq were the primary justification for the invasion of
Iraq, as a direct response to the 9/11 attacks. Among other intelligence, the leaked memo included a
report stating that "the Sept. I I hijacker Muhammed Atta met several times in Prague with a former
Iraqi intelligence chief, who in 2000 is said to have requested a transfer of funds to Mr. Atta." The
memo added that the CIA had not confirmed the meetings. Although C.I.A spokespersons declined to
comment on the memo, they stated that the letter delivered to the Senate Intelligence Committee from
former CIA director George Tenet remained the best measurement of the government's knowledge of
the links between Al Qaeda and Iraq. The October 2002 letter from Tenet stated that "there was 'credi-
ble reporting' that Al Qaeda leaders sought contacts in Iraq that could help them acquire the capability
to use weapons of mass destruction, and that 'Iraq has provided training to Al Qaeda members in the
areas of poisons and gases and making conventional bombs."
26. See Smith, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 233, 240-41. For an explanation of the exception to the general
rule that foreign states are immune from U.S. jurisdictions see generally, Kristine Cordier Kamezis,
Annotation, Award of Damages Under State-Sponsored Terrorism Exception to Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act (28 U.S. CA. § 1605(A)), 182 A.L.R. FED. 1 (2002).
27. See, e.g., Deroy Murdock, Saddam's Terror Ties, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Oct. 21, 2003, at
http://www.nationalreview.com/murdock/murdock2003102l0934.asp.
28. See THIERRY MEYSSAN, 9/11: THE BIG LIE (2003).
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pose the war on terror, especially when vested business interests may be at stake.
On October 26, 2001, Congress overwhelmingly passed, and the President
signed, an act entitled, Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropri-
ate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (sometimes misleadingly
referred to as "The Patriot Act"). 29 In addition to condemning discrimination
against Arab and Muslim Americans, 30 providing for victims of terrorism,3 1 and
providing for the sharing of information between government agencies (i.e., estab-
lishing an infrastructure for "connecting the dots"),32 this Act extended current
constitutionally tested procedures for investigating organized crime to investiga-
tions of terrorist activity.33
In 2002, the U.S. Congress overwhelmingly authorized the use of military
force against Iraq,34 and on November 8, 2002, a unanimous U.N. Security Council
adopted Resolution 1441, which found that Iraq had not "provided an accurate,
full, final, and complete disclosure, as required by Resolution 687 (1991), of all
aspects of its programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction,', 36 and held fur-
ther that Iraq "has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under
relevant resolutions. 37 Finally, a unanimous Security Council authorized "serious
29. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, H.R. 3162 RDS 107th Cong. (1st Sess. 2001).
The acronym of this act, which if spelled out to delete certain words, spells USAPATRIOT, is mislead-
ing in the sense that it conveys the impression to those unfamiliar with the act that the act has something
to do with patriotism per se.
30. Id. § 102. Section 102(a)(2) states: "The acts of violence that have been taken against Arab
and Muslim Americans since the September 11, 2001, attacks against the United States should be and
are condemned by all Americans who value freedom."
31. Id. §§ 611-14, 621-24. Section 611 (a) in general provides for expedited payment to benefici-
aries of public safety officers killed or permanently disabled as a result of a personal injury sustained in
the line of duty "in connection with prevention, investigation, rescue, or recovery efforts related to a
terrorist attack." The Act also sets up various victim's and emergency funds, for example, § 621 Crime
Victims Fund, 621 (d) Antiterrorism Emergency Reserve, 621 (e) Victims of Sept. 11, 2001, § 622 Crime
Victim Compensation, § 623 Crime Victim Assistance, § 624 Victims of Terrorism.
32. Id. § 203. In relation to law enforcement, section 203(b)(1) states: "Any investigative or law
enforcement officer, or attorney for the Government, who by any means authorized by this chapter, has
obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, or evidence derived
therefrom, may disclose such contents to any other Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective,
immigration, national defense, or national security official to the extent that such contents include for-
eign intelligence or counterintelligence ... to assist the official who is to receive that information in the
performance of his official duties."
33. Id. §§ 201-02, 204-25. The constitutionally protected procedures referred to include the inter-
ception of terrorist communications through the use of wire taps, audio and video surveillance, physical
searches, and the use of foreign intelligence.
34. H.J. Res. 114, 107th Cong., 2nd Sess. (2002). The House of Representatives on Oct. 10
passed the resolution by a vote of 296-133. Senate approval came in a late-night vote of 77-23.
35. S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 4644th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (2002) [herein-
after S.C. Res. 1441].
36. Id. at 1; S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2981st mtg. at 11, U.N. Doe. S/RES/687
(1991); see also Information on biological weapons programme reported hidden. (Iraq), U.N. CHRON.
(Dec. 1, 1995), 1995 WL12598335.
37. S.C. Res 1441, supra note 35, at 3; see also Russell Taylor, 'Seize This Opportunity' Iraq In-
dicated it Will Comply, UN CHRON. (Dec. 1,2002) 2002 WL 21468499.
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consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations."
'38
In light of later claims by some journalists and pundits that the U.S. Congress
and the President went to war in Iraq based on faulty intelligence that Iraq had
weapons of mass destruction,39 it is useful to note that a unanimous Security Coun-
cil, including Syria, France, Germany, Russia, and China made a specific finding
that Iraq was already in possession of weapons of mass destruction (having been
found in previous U.N. inspections). 40 Thus, the imposition of "serious conse-
quences" by Syria et al., against Iraq was authorized not on the basis of a possible
discovery of weapons at some future time, but rather on the basis that Iraq had not
accounted for weapons previously discovered by U.N. inspectors. In any case,
U.N. inspector David Kay has since reported his discovery in Iraq of "dozens of
WMD-related program activities.., stains of organisms... used to produce bio-
logical agents ... a clandestine network of laboratories ... that contained (chemi-
cal-biological weapons) research ... and unmanned aerial vehicles... in violation
of UN resolutions.,41
After the unanimous adoption of Resolution 1441, the only question remain-
ing was the import of the words "serious consequences." Not surprisingly, an
overwhelming majority of European leaders, including those in Italy, Spain, Great
Britain, and a virtually unanimous block of Eastern European countries, interpreted
this phrase as including military action,42 and supported the U.S. effort to enforce
U.N. Resolution 1441 by the use of military force. In the end, the only significant
European holdouts in supporting the U.S. effort to enforce Resolution 1441 were
France, Germany, and Belgium.43
Indeed, in light of the fact that severe economic sanctions had already been
imposed on Iraq for a number of years, it is difficult to imagine any reasonable in-
terpretation of the U.N. mandate to impose "serious consequences," other than ac-
tual enforcement by armed force.
The U.N. mandate authorizing serious consequences was reinforced by a pre-
vious U.N. Resolution, which had acknowledged that the 9/11 terrorist attacks on
the World Trade Center were a "threat to international peace and security," and
specifically "recognize(d)" the right of self-defense and a "readiness to take all
necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks."'44 This latter recognition by the
Security Council was important in applying Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which
38. S.C. Res 1441., supra note 35, at 5; Taylor, supra note 37.
39. See Robert Dreyfuss, More Missing Intelligence, THE NATION, June 19, 2003, available at
http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20030707&s=dreyfuss.
40. See S.C. Res. 1441, supra note 35.
41. Colin Powell, Powell Says Kay Report Confirms Iraq Defied UN Resolution 1441, (Oct. 7,
2003), at http://usinfo.state.gov/mena/Archive/2004/Feb/I 1-286155.html (quoting the report of David
Kay, a U.N. weapons inspector in Iraq).
42. See Harvey Sicherman, Why France Gave the U.S. the Boot, Hist. News Network, (Mar. 24,
2003), at http://www.hnn.us/articles/1347.html.
43. Edward 1. Koch, History is Now Repeating Itself- Why Don't the American Bashers Gasp It?,
JEWISH WORLD REV., (Feb. 12, 2003), at http://www.jewishworldreview.com/0203/koch021203.asp.
44. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4386th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001).
2004
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
specifically states, "Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security.
' 45
In light of the fact that the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and
Pentagon were equal to or greater in scope than the attack on Pearl Harbor by the
Japanese in 1941,46 it is not surprising that the Security Council recognized the ter-
rorist attacks as armed attacks, thus justifyiing the use of unilateral action by the
United States even without prior U.N. authorization. However, the latter point has
proved superfluous, as "serious consequences" against Iraq were indeed specifi-
cally authorized by a unanimous Security Council in Resolution 144 1.
Despite the unanimous U.N. Security Council authorization of the imposition
of serious consequences on Iraq, the once overwhelming support of the American
people, 48 and the U.S. Congress' authorization of the use of force against Iraq, the
effort by a coalition of forty-six nations49 to enforce U.N. Resolution 1441 has
been undermined by political and media opposition-not only by some Islamic
countries, Germany, and France, but also by some Americans.50
The tone for this opposition has been set by the "fringe" or alternative press.
Examples of the latter include the much publicized statements by a Columbia Uni-
versity professor who told students at an anti-war "teach-in" that he hoped Amer-
ica would suffer "a million" deaths in the form of "a million Mogadishus."' Oth-
ers have suggested that President Bush and the Jews knew about the attacks before
they happened.52
45. U.N. CHARTER, art. 51.
46. See generally Mike Burleson, September 11 & Pearl Harbor, Buzzle.com, ( Dec. 5, 2002), at
http://www.buzzle.com/editorials/12-4-2002-31581 asp.
47. S.C. Res. 1441,supra note 35, at 5.
48. See, e.g., Doyle McManus, Public Still Backs Military Move on Iraq, L.A. TIMES, Sep. 2,
2002 ("The poll found that 59% of Americans believe the U.S. should take military action to remove
Hussein from power; 29% were opposed; and 12% were unsure.").
49. The following forty-six nations publicly committed themselves to the coalition effort in Iraq:
Afghanistan, Albania, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Columbia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Den-
mark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Honduras, Hungary, Ice-
land, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia,
Netherlands, Nicaragua, Palau, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Singapore,
Slovakia, Solomon Islands, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, Uz-
bekistan. The White House, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Coalition Members, (Mar. 21, 2003), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030321-4.html.
50. Arab Opposition to War Against Iraq Escalated, Arabic News.com, ( Feb. 11, 2003), at
http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/030211/2003021101 .html. See e.g., Veterans Against the
Iraq War, at http://www.vaiw.org/vet/index.php.
51. Jonah Goldberg, Columbia Prof s Comments Anti-American, (Apr. 2, 2003), available at
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/882520/posts. Professor Nicholas De Genova was quoted as
stating that he wished America would suffer "a million Mogadishus", in apparent reference to the
"Black Hawk Down" incident in which 18 Americans were killed. A "million" Mogadishu's would
therefore actually translate into 18 million American deaths.
52. See generally John King, Bush Briefed on hijacking threat before September 11, CNN.com,
May 16, 2002, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/05/15/bush.sept.l 1/; David Duke, How Israeli Terror-
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Although pundits such as Paul Krugman of the New York Times (Times) have
not been quite so candid,53 any misfortune which befalls American troops in Iraq is
used as ammunition with which to undermine the allied effort in Iraq, creating a
kind of symbiotic, though surely unintended, relationship between anti-war politi-
cians in the United States and Iraqi terrorists. The terrorists kill innocent people in
Iraq, thereby giving U.S. politicians grounds for asserting that the war is a quag-
mire, and therefore Bush should be removed from office; in return, the terrorists
are rewarded with support in the form of demands by U.S. politicians to withdraw
and leave Iraq to the tender mercies of al Qaeda.
Indeed, political opposition has continued even after a unanimous U.N. Reso-
lution was passed in mid-2004 affirming the U.S. policy and timetable for handing
over political power to a freely elected Iraqi government.54
It is now apparent that the media will play a large role in both defining and in-
fluencing the national will in the war on terror, and more specifically the effort to
transfer full sovereignty to the people of Iraq. Considerations of international law,
as well as domestic constitutional law will also have a significant impact on the
conduct of this war.
Part II will examine the role of the media in influencing this first major war of
the twenty-first century. Part III will review current considerations of international
and domestic constitutional law, and Part IV will consider the effect of national
will and resolve. Part V concludes that: 1) the coalition effort to enforce U.N.
Resolution 1441 has been in accordance with international law; 2) domestic anti-
terrorism laws and policies comply with U.S. Supreme Court precedent; and 3) the
thrust of current media coverage is undermining both the war against terror and the
coalition effort to stabilize Iraq and transfer full sovereignty.
II. MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE WAR AGAINST TERROR
Unlike dictatorships in which one leader can make the decision to go to war,
democracies require the broad support of the citizenry. The media, represented by
ism and American Treason Caused the September I I Attacks, David Duke Online, Sept. 11, 2002, at
http://www.duke.org/writings/howisraelcaused9l I.pdf.
53. Paul Krugman, Who Lost Iraq?, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2004, at 27. Krugman writes:
The Iraq venture may have been doomed from the start-but we'll never know for sure be-
cause the Bush administration made such a mess of the occupation. Future historians will
view it as a case study of how not to run a country. Up to a point, the numbers in the
Brookings Institution's invaluable Iraq Index tell the tale. Figures on the electricity supply
and oil production show a pattern of fitful recovery and frequent reversals; figures on in-
surgent attacks and civilian casualties show a security situation that got progressively
worse, not better; public opinion polls show an occupation that squandered the initial good
will. What the figures don't describe is the toxic mix of ideological obsession and crony-
ism that lie behind that dismal performance.
Id. See also Paul Krugman, What About Iraq?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2004, at A19. Again Krugman:
One thing is clear: calls to 'stay the course' are fatuous. The course we're on leads down-
hill. American soldiers keep winning battles, but we're losing the war: our military is un-
der severe strain; we're creating more terrorists than we're killing; our reputation, includ-
ing our moral authority, is damaged each month this goes on.
54. S.C. Res. 1546, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4987th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (2004).
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films, television, newspapers, magazines, and in recent years the internet, plays a
pivotal role in shaping that opinion.
For this reason, it has been rare in human history that a true democracy initi-
ates aggressive war. Thus, it is a Hitler's Germany that attacks Poland, or an It-
aly's Mussolini that attacks Ethiopia. It is rarer still for a democratic nation to en-
gage in successful war without the overwhelming support of the electorate.
In World War II, public support for the allied war effort was nurtured and
promoted by the western media in films, newspapers, and magazines. 55 It has now
become fashionable in journalistic circles to denigrate the uncritical coverage of
World War II by the Western media as "cheerleading" and war-mongering; it is
suggested that the Western media should have been more neutral in its coverage,
giving the pro-Nazi view alongside the anti-Nazi view.56
Balance in journalism goes far beyond simply reporting facts accurately.
Emphasis, punctuation, and selection of visual images often speak louder and more
effectively in shaping opinions than editorial expressions.
Even aside from assertions coming from the "fringe" and alternative press,
most Americans can recognize propaganda in its crudest form (just as they took the
rants of "Baghdad Bob" with a generous does of salt.57 Far more insidious, how-
ever, are the more disguised forms of propaganda camouflaged as news.
For example, in the aftermath of the Times scandal in which reporter Jayson
Blair's fabrications corrupted literally hundreds of "mainstream" media stories,58
there has been a closer examination of the abusive methods and practices that the
Times has employed to present opinion in the guise of news-methods which in-
clude omission, distortion, emphasis, and outright falsification. 59 When the Times
deliberately distorted the views of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger as the
basis for publishing a headline that "Republicans Break With Bush on Iraq,' 6° the
Washington Post published an article by Pulitzer Prize-winning columnist Charles
Krauthammer decrying the Times' unscrupulous journalistic tactics:
Not since William Randolph Hearst famously cabled his correspondent in Cuba,
"You furnish the pictures, and I'll furnish the war," has a newspaper so blatantly
55. JORDAN BRAVERMAN, To HASTEN THE HOMECOMING: How AMERICANS FOUGHT WORLD
WAR II THROUGH THE MEDIA (1995).
56. Noam Chomsky, What Makes Mainstream Media Mainstream, ZMAGAZINE, June 1997,
available at http://www.zmag.org/chomsky/articles/z9710-mainstream-media.html.
57. Center for Individual Freedom, The Collected Quotations of "Baghdad Bob, " Mohammed
Saeed al-Sahaf" The Iraqi Minister of Disinformation, at
http://www.cfif.orghtdocs/freedomline/current/in our_opinionlbaghdad-bob.htm.
58. See BOB KOHN, JOURNALISTIC FRAUD: HOW THE NEW YORK TIMES DISTORTS THE NEWS AND
WHY IT CAN NO LONGER BE TRUSTED 2-3, (2003).
59. Id.; see also Bob Kohn, Bad Times; The Decline and Fall of the New York Times, THE WKLY
STANDARD May 24, 2004, at Books & Arts Section (reviewing Jayson Blair's book, Burning Down
My Masters' House My Life at the New York Times); see e.g., Christopher Caldwell, The New York
Times's Meltdown: What explains it?, THE WKLY. STANDARD, May 26, 2003.
60. Todd S. Purdum & Patrick E. Tyler, Top Republicans Break with Bush on Iraq Strategy, N. Y.
TIMES, Aug. 16, 2002, at Al.
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devoted its front pages to editorializing about a coming American war as has
Howard Raines' New York Times. Hearst was for the Spanish American war.
Raines (for those who have been incommunicado for the last year) opposes war
with Iraq.
61
Although an unabashed Times later printed a retraction (buried on a back
page), and Times Editor Harold Raines responded to Krauthammer's with an ad
hominem attack on Krauthammer,62 it was apparent that both Raines and the Times
had missed the point: it is well and fine to slant, editorialize, and even propagan-
dize on the editorial page, but it is dishonest and unprincipled-akin to the use of
subliminal messages-to disguise opinion as objective news.
A review of Times practices by prize-winning essayist and attorney, Bob
Kohn, has revealed a litany of journalistic abuses 63 a few examples are illustrative.
Perhaps most notorious is the deliberate manipulation of polls-a tactic often used
by totalitarian regimes. 64 In addition to laying the groundwork for a selected poll
by running a series of editorials disguised as objective news stories and then selec-
tively commissioning and timing polls on issues it has been advocating, the Times
either declines to publish results it deems unsatisfactory or distorts the poll results
in huge headlines.65
For example, when a New York Times/CBS News Poll revealed that 88 percent
of Americans supported Bush's military action against Afghanistan, the Times "ob-
jective" analysis of the results was: "Survey Shows Doubts Stirring on Terror
War.
, ,66
Satisfied that its own distortions and selective reporting must have had an ad-
verse effect on public opinion, a confident Times commissioned a poll on public
opinion about the war in Iraq. When the results revealed that 67 percent of the
American people supported going to war against Iraq but that a smaller majority of
Americans agreed that the President was spending his time "about right" on the
war, the Times was faced with the problem of spinning these results in a negative
way. It finally came up with the blaring headline: "Public Says Bush Needs to Pay
More Heed to Economy, Less to Iraq."
67
61. E.g., Charles Krauthammer, Kidnapped by the Times, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 2002 at B7,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A31321-2002AugI 7.html; accord Educa-
tion for Peace in Iraq Center, Understanding the New Debate on Iraq, Aug. 19, 2004, at
http://www.epic-usa.org/Default.aspx?tabid--92; Cynthia Cotts, Howellin' Wolf: 'Times' Hounds Bush
Over War Plan, VILLAGE VOICE, Sept 3, 2002, available at
http://www.villagevoice.com/issues/0235/cotts.php.
62. See Rem Rieder, Asking the Tough Questions, AM. JOURNALISM REv., Oct. 2002, available at
http://www.ajr.org/Article.asp.id=2633 (disagreeing with Krauthammer).
63. See generally KOHN, supra note 61.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Richard L. Berke & Janet Elder, Survey Shows Doubts Stirring On Terror War, N. Y. TIMES,
Oct. 30, 2001, at Al. The apparent basis for the blaring headline was the response to a secondary ques-
tion about whether the government was telling "everything" it knew about the anthrax attacks; a major-
ity of 3% said no.
67. Adam Nagoumey & Janet Elder, Public Says Bush Needs to Pay Heed to Weak Economy, Oct.
2004
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The latter distortion was too much to stomach even for a former political ad-
visor to President Clinton, who observed that, "[t]he phrasing of the questions is so
slanted and biased that it amounts to journalistic 'push polling'-the use of 'objec-
tive' polling to generate a predetermined result, and so vindicate a specific point of
1168view.
When a New York Times/CBS News poll taken on March 21, 2003 revealed
that 74 percent of Americans approved of military action against Iraq,69 the Times
analysis of the results was predictable: "there are deep-partisan divisions in the na-
tion's view of the conflict." 70 CBS News, on the other hand, had no problem in re-
porting directly: "Poll: U.S. Backs Bush on War." 71 Indeed, it is difficult to imag-
ine the Times publishing such a headline no matter what the poll results showed.
The war in Iraq has been fraught with difficulties and dangers to American
soldiers. But one might think that on a celebrated day of success-the fall of
Baghdad and the tumbling of Hussein's statue by elated Iraqis-the Times might
have softened just once to set aside its negative spinning. However, on the same
day that USA Today reported the fall of Baghdad with a headline reading, "Bagh-
dad Falls; Jubilant Troops Swarm Around U.S. Troops, 72 the Times could only
mange a grudging, "U.S. Forces Take Control In Baghdad; Bush Elated. 7 3 In
other words, what was important in the Times story was not the jubilation of the
Iraqi people, but the fact that a presumably gloating Bush was "elated."
Perhaps mindful of a 2001 New York Times/CBS News poll that only 6 per-
cent of Americans would oppose military action against those responsible for the
7, 2002, N. Y. TIMES, at Al.
68. KOHN, supra note 58, at 217 citing Dick Morris, The Times Push Poll, N. Y. POST, Oct. 8,
2002.
69. Dick Meyer, Polls, Powell and the Iraq Campaign, CBS NEWS, Feb. 7, 2003, available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/02/07/opinion/meyer/main539846.shtml.
70. KOHN, supra note 58, at 245 citing Adam Nagourney & Janet Elder, Support for Bush Surges
at Home, But Split Remains, N. Y. TIMES, March 22, 2003, at Al.
71. Id.; see also Meyer, supra note 69 ("On Thursday, CBS News and The New York Times re-
interviewed a sample of respondents first interviewed two weeks ago... 74% now approve of the U.S.
taking military action against Iraq ....")
72. USA TODAY, April 10, 2003, at front page.
73. Anthony DePalma, A Nation at War: An Overview: April 9, 2003: Joy in Baghdad, Arab Con-
sternation and the Mystery of Saddam Hussein, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2003, at B I; see also Gallup Poll,
ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Sept. 24, 2003, at A30; See also Nicholas Johnson, Poll of Baghdad Resi-
dents Finds Optimism and Criticism, THE PHLADELPHIA INQUIRER, Sept. 25, 2003, available at
http://www.philly.com/mld/inquirer/2003/09/25/news/nation/6853491.htm. A 2003 Gallup poll re-
vealed that "almost 2/3 of those polled in Baghdad said it was worth the hardships suffered since the
U.S. led invasion ousted Saddam Hussein." In addition, 67% of 1,178 Iraqi's polled stated that "within
five years, their lives would be better than before the American and British invasion." American Enter-
prise magazine with Zogby International completed a poll of 600 Iraqis in August 2003 which showed
that 37% of Iraqis polled stated that the United States government was the government they would most
like to see their new government modeled after. Saudi Arabia came in second with 28%. Further, 60%
stated that they would not want to see the formation of an Islamic government. Data Reveal Inaccura-
cies in Portrayal of Iraqis, Zogby International, avaliable at
http://www.zogby.com/soundbites/Readclips.dbm?iD=5974.
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9/11 attacks, 14 the mainstream media has assiduously avoided reporting any evi-
dence that might link Iraq to the 9/11 attacks. For example, when on May 7, 2003,
a federal court in Manhattan found evidence sufficient under the F.R.E. to establish
that "Iraq provided material support to bin Laden and al-Qaeda, ' 75 and ordered
Hussein to pay $104 million to the families of two 9/11 victims, 76 one might have
thought this an item worthy of reporting to the American public. However, project-
ing its anti-war views in the face of a nation united by an 88 percent support for
retaliation should Iraqi involvement be revealed, was obviously something neither
the Times nor any other mainstream media was prepared to confront, and so the
legal findings of Iraqi complicity in the 9/11 attacks were neatly buried.
Evidence buried by the media includes the following: 1) a report in an official
Iraqi newspaper, in which Hussein's son Uday ran a "List of Honor" which in-
cluded the Iraqi intelligence officer responsible for coordinating activities with al-
Qaeda;77 2) evidence that an al-Qaeda operative, Abu al-Zarqawi, opened a terror-
ist training camp in Iraq;78 3) the discovery of documents in Takrit, Iraq, revealing
that al-Qaeda operative, Abdul Yasin, was on Hussein's payroll (Yasin was later
indicted for bombing the World Trade Center);79 and 4) Hussein's Salman Pak ter-
ror camp trained hijackers on an actual passenger jet.8°
74. KOHN, supra note 58, at 213.




77. Id.; see also, Gilbert S. Merritt, Document Links Saddam, bin Laden, THE TENESSEAN, June
25, 2003, available at http://tennessean.com/nation-
world/archives/03/06/34908297.shtml?ElementID=34908297.
The list was reportedly published on the back page of the now-defunct Iraqi daily newspaper Babil on
November 14, 2002. Uday Hussein was the publisher of Babil and the story was described a "List of
Honor," purportedly a list of Saddam's regime members with their names and positions listed. Judge
Merrit, who was in Iraq to help rebuild the judicial system, describes the list as "the 600 people closest
to Saddam Hussein," and states:
Through an unusual set of circumstances, I have been given documentary evidence of the
names and positions of the 600 closest people in Iraq to Saddam Hussein, as well as his
ongoing relationship with Osama bin Laden... the list contained not only the names of the
55 "deck of cards" players.., but also 550 others... The document shows that an Iraqi
intelligence officer, Abid A1-Karim Muhamed Aswod, assigned to the Iraq embassy in
Pakistan, is "responsible for the coordination of activities with the Osama bin Laden
group."
78. Id.
79. Merrit, supra note 77; see also, John Diamond, U.S. says Iraq sheltered suspect in '93 WTC
Attack, USA TODAY, Sept. 17, 2003, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-09-
17-iraq-wtcx.htm.
Military, intelligence, and law enforcement officials reported finding a large cache of Ara-
bic-language documents in Tikrit, Saddam's political stronghold. A U.S. intelligence offi-
cial, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said translators and analysts are busy "separat-
ing the gems from the junk." The official said some of the analysts have concluded that the
documents show that Saddam's government provided monthly payments and a home for
Yasin. Yasin is on the FBI's list of 22 most-wanted terrorist fugitives; there is a $25 mil-
lion reward for his capture. The bureau questioned and released him in New York shortly
after the bombing in 1993. After Yasin had fled to Iraq, the FBI said it found evidence that
he helped make the bomb, which killed six people and injured 1,000. Yasin is still at large.
80. Id.; see also, Deroy Murdock, The 9/11 Connection: What Salman Pak Could Reveal, NAT'L
2004
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Writing in the Times, columnist William Safire, on November 23, 2003, re-
vealed government "evidence that Saddam's spy agency and top Qaeda operatives
were in frequent contact for a decade." 81 A sixteen page letter issued by the De-
fense Department in response to a Senate Intelligence Committee request for evi-
dence of a Hussein link to 9/11 included a "classified annex of raw reports" of "the
relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda. ' '82 Safire concluded that "with so much
connective tissue exposed.., the burden of proof has shifted to those still grimly
in denial. 83
It is understandable that a journal unalterably committed to an agenda of
peace at any price would be tempted to suppress evidence of a foreign country's
attack on the United States for fear that such evidence might provide a basis for
retaliation; it shows, however, a deep lack of respect for the right of the people to
know.
Unscrupulous as such journalistic methods are, however, it would be naive to
pretend they are not effective. The daily, relentless diet of journalistic emphasis on
the negative aspects of the effort to restore democracy in Iraq is having its desired
effect, sapping the will of the American people to restore democracy and sover-
eignty to the people of Iraq.84 In a self-fulfilling prophecy, support for U.S. policy
in Iraq is indeed being undermined effectively, as support falls to a bare majority-
insufficient to sustain a credible war on terror.
85
REV. ONLINE, Apr. 3, 2003, available at http://www.nationalreview.com/murdock/murdock040303.asp.
See also, Interview with Sabah Khodada, former Iraqi Army Officer by PBS Frontline, (Oct. 14, 2001),
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/gunning/interviews/khodada.html. Kho-
dada describes what went on at Salman Pak, including details on training hijackers. When asked about
the relationship between the September II attacks and Salman Pak Khodada stated:
I assure you, this operation was conducted by people who were trained by Saddam. And
I'm going to keep assuring the world this is what happened. Osama bin Laden has no such
capabilities. Why? Because this [sic] kind of attacks must be, and has to be, organized by a
capable state, such as Iraq; a state where they can provide high level of training, and they
can provide high level of intelligence to do such training. How could Osama bin Laden-
who's hiding in the middle of nowhere in Afghanistan in small caves and valleys-train
people and gather information and send people to do such high-level operation? We all
know this is a high-level operation. This cannot be done by a person who does not even
own a plane in Afghanistan, who cannot offer such training in Afghanistan. This is defi-
nitely done by a mastermind like Saddam ....
81. William Safire, Missing Links Found, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2003, at A23.
82. Id.
83. Id; see also, William Safire, Al Qaeda's Links to Saddam Emerge, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov.
25, 2003, at 7; see also, Stephen F. Hayes, Case Closed: The U.S. Government's Secret Memo Detailing
Cooperation Between Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden, THE WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 24, 2003;
Stephen F. Hayes, The Connection: Not So Long Ago, the Ties Between Iraq and Al Qaeda were Con-
ventional Wisdom. The Conventional Wisdom was Right, THE WKLY. STANDARD, June 7, 2004.
84. See generally, Josh Bernstein, Corzine Warns of Difficult Road Ahead in Iraq, BURLINGTON
COUNTY TIMES, Apr. 15, 2003, available at
http://corzine.senate.gov/clippings/iraqburlingtontimes%204.15.03.pdf.
85. In an August 20, 2004 report titled, "U.S. Public Beliefs and Attitudes about Iraq," from The
Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA/Knowledge Networks Poll) in the Center on Policy
Attitudes and the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland, College
Park, the researchers compiled polling information from a nationwide poll given August 5-11, 2004 to a
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III. INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW
The legal aspects of the war on terror can be divided into three distinct cate-
gories: 1) international law relating to the law of war and the use of force, 2) do-
mestic law relating to internal national security, and 3) international and domestic
law relating to the legal rights of detainees captured in the war on terror. Each shall
be addressed separately in this section.
A. International Law Relating to the Law of War and the Use of Force
It has already been noted that the primary legal basis for military action
against Iraq was Security Council Resolution 1441,86 which found Hussein's Iraq
to be in possession of weapons of mass destruction and in violation of directives to
account to the United Natuibs for those weapons previously discovered by U.N.
inspectors.87 In addition, it was noted that U.N. Resolution 1368 specifically rec-
ognized that the 9/11 attacks constituted an armed "threat to international peace
and security," and that Article 51 of the U.N. Charter specifically provides for the
unilateral use of armed force in self defense to such an armed attack. 88
random sample of 733 Americans. The polling data revealed that positive perceptions of the war in Iraq
had steadily decreased and negative perceptions of the war effort had steadily increased since July of
2003. Among other questions, PIPA asked participants, "Do you think the US made the right decision
or the wrong decision in going to war against Iraq?" In July of 2003, 63% thought that going to war was
the right decision and in the August 2004 survey only 46% thought it was the right decision.
Furthermore, when asked "how confidant are you that the US intervention in Iraq will suc-
ceed?" 36% were in the "confidant" range (i.e. gave a 6-10 in a scale of 0-10), 17% were in the neutral
range (5), and 46% were in the pessimistic range (0-4). The earlier polling that PIPA conducted in 2003
through early 2004 revealed that positive perceptions of the war in Iraq were based largely on the views
that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and that Iraq was linked to al Qaeda and the 9/11 at-
tacks. The decrease in support is attributed to an increase in the opposing positions, namely that Iraq
did not have WMD's, that Iraq did not support al Qaeda in any deep sense, and also that world public
opinion was unfavorable to the Iraq war.
Similar polls that have been conducted show a decrease in public support of the war effort as
well. A nationwide Pew Research Center/Council on Foreign Relations survey conducted by Princeton
Survey Research Associates on August 5-10, 2004, revealed similar results to the PIPA survey, al-
though the number of those who supported the war effort was slightly higher. Pew asked the following
question. "Do you think the U.S. made the right decision or the wrong decision in using military force
against Iraq?" 53% stated that military force was the right decision and 41% said it was they wrong
decision. This is in contrast to the results from that same poll question in April of 2003 in which 74%
answered that military action was the right decision and 19% answered that it was the wrong decision.
A graph of the polling results from the Pew Research Center reveals a fairly steady decrease in support
for the war effort from spring of 2003 to the present. This data is consistent with Newsweek and Gallup
polls conducted from July 2003 to September 2004. Eroding Respect for America Seen as Major
Proble: Foreign Policy Attitudes Now Driven by 9/11 and Iraq, The Pew Research Center for People
and the Press (2004), available at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/222.pdf; see also What Now?
http://www.pollingreport.com/iraq.htm.
86. S.C. Res. 1441, supra note 35.
87. See supra notes 22-42 and accompanying text.
88. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 4730th Mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1368 (2001). In addition to rec-
ognizing that the 9/11 attacks were a "threat to international peace and security," Resolution 1368 stated
that the U.N. is "determined to combat by all means threats to international peace and security caused
by terrorist acts... and stresses that those responsible for aiding, supporting or harbouring the perpetra-
tors, organizers and sponsors of these acts will be held accountable..." Articles 51 and 42 of the U.N.
2004
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Furthermore, it should be noted that terms of the 1991 Gulf War cease-fire
agreement required Iraq to permit U.N. inspectors into the country.89 When Iraq
openly breached that agreement in 1998, it effectively abrogated the cease-fire
agreement and thereby re-established the state of war in existence prior to the sign-
ing of the agreement.90 President Bush even made a special trip to the United Na-
tions to explain that the primary purpose of going to war in Iraq was the enforce-
ment of these U.N. resolutions. 9 1
Despite what might appear to be a clear statement of the grounds for taking
military action in Iraq, there have been persistent claims in the media that the real
reasons for going to war were "for oil,"'92 or to find weapons of mass destruction.
Charter allows the Security Council to use force if economic sanctions or other methods prove inade-
quate, but article 51 maintains the right of each sovereign nation to defend itself. U.N. CHARTER art.
51.
Article 42 states, "Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 [eco-
nomic sanctions etc.] would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by
air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security."
U.N. CHARTER art. 42, para. 1.
89. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 2983d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/687 (1991), para 9(a). ("Iraq shall
submit to the Secretary-General, within fifteen days of the adoption of the present resolution, a declara-
tion on the locations, amounts and types of all items specified in paragraph 8 [all chemical and biologi-
cal weapons, including stocks of agents, related components, subsystems, research, development, sup-
port, and manufacturing facilities and all ballistic missiles with a greater range than 150 km including
related parts, repair, and production facilities] and agree to urgent on-site inspection... [by United Na-
tions Special Commission]").
90. S.C. Res. 1205, U.N. SCOR, 3939th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1205 (1998).
The Security Council, Noting with alarm the decision of Iraq on 31 October 1998 to cease
cooperation with the United Nations Special Commission, and its continued restrictions on
the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) ... Acting under Chapter
VII of the Charter of the United Nations; Condemns the decision by Iraq of 31 October
1998 to cease cooperation.., as a flagrant violation of resolution 687 (1991); Reaffirms its
intention to act in accordance with the relevant provisions of resolution 687 (1991) on the
duration of the prohibitions referred to in that resolution, and notes that by its failure so to
comply with its relevant obligations Iraq has delayed the moment when the council can do
so. Id.
91. See U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., 2d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/57/PV.2 (2002). President Bush
stated in his address to the General Assembly: "In order to suspend hostilities and to spare himself,
Iraq's dictator accepted a series of commitments. The terms were clear to him, and to all. And he agreed
to prove that he is complying with every one of those obligations ..." Id. at 6.
All the world now faces a test and the United Nations a difficult and defining moment. Are
Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced or cast aside without conse-
quence? We want the resolutions of the world's most important multilateral body to be en-
forced, and right now those resolutions are being unilaterally subverted by the Iraqi re-
gime. Id. at 8.
See also, White House, President's Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly, Sept. 12, 2002,
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/print/20020912- .html.
92. John le Carre, The United States Has Gone Mad, THE TIMES (LONDON), Jan. 15, 2003, at 20;
Anthony F. Greco, Letter to the Editor, Iraq and Oil, Still Inseparable, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2003, at
A20 ("The Bush administration is committed to the forceful assertion of American primacy in the
world. The maximization of American power and influence in the Middle East is critical to that end,
and Saddam Hussein stands in our way."). See also White House Continues to 'Spin' Reasons for
Flawed Iraq War, USA TODAY, June 23, 2004, at 12A.
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Some commentators have even gone so far as to claim that the United States relied
on the doctrine of "preemptive strike" to justify going to war,93 despite the fact that
Secretary of State Colin Powell specifically and publicly rejected this rationale,
stating, "If you look at our National Security Strategy, you will see that there is no
chapter that says 'preemption.' It talks about partnerships. It talks about alliances.
It talks about human rights. It talks about trade. It talks about all those things that
will make a better world for all people. 94
Vice President Cheney has spoken of the preemption doctrine in very limited
terms: "If the United States could have preempted 9/11, we would have; no ques-
tion. Should we be able to prevent another, much more devastating attack, we
will; no question., 95 In other words, the United States reserves the right to shoot
down aircraft attacking U.S. cities.
Thus, although the United States did not rely on the preemptive strike doc-
trine to justify going to war, it is clear that it could have done so. As international
lawyer, Stephen Murdoch, has noted, preemption "is considered (by international
lawyers) to be a legitimate use of force in international law., 96 Indeed, few interna-
tional lawyers today would deny that Israel did not have the right in 1967 to en-
gage in a preemptive strike against the Arab countries that were threatening immi-
nent invasion and expressing the intent, as stated by Iraq President Rashman Aref
that "Our goal is clear-to wipe Israel off the map.",
97
B. Domestic Law Relating to Internal National Security
The primary federal statute relating to internal security is an act entitled, Unit-
ing and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Inter-
cept and Obstruct Terrorism, often referred to by its acronym, the USA PATRIOT
Act (Patriot Act).98 The inch-thick act, which runs to some 342 printed pages, is a
heavy read, and it is questionable how many commentators have taken the mini-
mum twelve to sixteen hours it takes to read and fully analyze this act.
93. Mike Allen & Barton Gellman, Preemptive Strikes Part of U.S. Strategic Doctrine: "All Op-
tions " Open for Countering Unconventional Arms, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2002, at Al.
94. Interview by The Washington Post Editorial Board with Colin Powell, Secretary of State,
(July 23, 2003), available at http://www.hongkong.usconsolate.gov.
95. Memorandum from Ivo Daalder to Members of the CFR/ASIL Roundtable on Old Rules/New
Threats: Policy Implications of the Bush Doctrine on Preemption, Council on Foreign Relations (Oct.
11, 2003), available at http://www.cfr.org/publication.php?id=525 1.
96. Stephen Murdoch, Preemptive War: Is It Legal?, Jan. 2003, at http://www.dcbar.org.
97. Who Started the Six Day War?, HASBARA FELLOWSHIPS, at
http://www.israelactivism.com/resources/factsheets/factsheets/who startedjthe_6.asp. (The full quote
from President Abdel Rahman Muhammad Aref of Iraq was: "The existence of Israel is an error that
must be rectified. This is our opportunity to wipe out the ignominy which has been with us since 1948.
Our goal is clear-to wipe Israel off the face of the map."). See also Michael B. Oren, Did Israel Want
The Six Day War?, 5759 AZURE 1-37 (Spring 1999), available at http://www.azure.org.il/7-Oren.html;
see generally 110-11 DAVID KIMCHE & DAN BAWLY, THE SANDSTORM: THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR OF
JUNE 1967: PRELUDE AND AFTERMATH (Stein and Day, 1968); see also Policy Statement, Israel and the
Occupied Territories: Statement made by The International Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists
at the UN Commission on Human Rights, INT'L ASS'N OF JEWISH LAW. & JURISTS, Apr. 2, 2002, avail-
able at http://www.intjewishlawyers.org/html/policy-statements/april_2.html.
98. HR 3162 RDS, 107' Cong. (2001) (enacted) (also known as "The Patriot Act").
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This daunting task has not kept a number of commentators from expressing
their opinion of the Patriot Act's import. It has been asserted, for example, that the
Patriot Act "gives... law enforcement the ability [to] monitor email and telephone
conversations without probable cause." 99 The American Civil Liberties Union
states that "the USA PATRIOT act gives the Attorney General and federal law en-
forcement unnecessary and permanent new powers to violate civil liberties that go
far beyond the stated goal of fighting international terrorism."' 00 The Electronic
Frontier Foundation claims, "[t]he civil liberties of ordinary Americans have taken
a tremendous blow with this law, especially the right to privacy in our online
communications and activities."' 0'
The notion that any surveillance in defense of national security and safety is
suspect recalls the statement of the Secretary of War in 1941 when explaining why
it was not appropriate to conduct the kind of electronic surveillance that could have
alerted the United States to the impending attack on Pearl Harbor, "Gentlemen
don't read other gentlemen's mail."'1 2 Commendable and civil as such sentiments
might be, they appear strangely na'ive in the aftermath of attacks on Pearl Harbor,
the World Trade Center, and the Pentagon.'
0 3
In fact, however, the Patriot Act primarily extends to investigations of terror-
ist activity the surveillance and search procedures which had previously been ap-
plied (and constitutionally approved) in organized crime cases.'4 Where new pro-
cedures are provided, specific provisions are made for judicial review.'0 5 For
example, Section 215106 is often maligned as providing for unlimited warrantless
searches of such tangible items as records and papers, and most notoriously it is
99. Catlin Gregg, Patriot Act of 2001-Friend or Foe, July 1, 2004, available at
http://www.home-inter.net/CaitlinGregg/finalproject.htm.
100. Letter from Laura Murphy, Director, ACLU Washington Office to the U.S. Senate, (Oct. 23,
200 1), available at http://www.aclu.org/NationalSecurity.cfm?ID=922&C-n 1.
101. Electronic Frontier Foundation, EFF Analysis of the Provisions of the USA PA TRIOT Act, Oct.
31, 2001, at http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/20011031 _eft_usa_patriotanalysis.html.
102. See, e.g., R. Emmett Tyrrell Jr., CIA's Future, WASH.TIMES, July 16, 2004, available at
http://www.washingtontimes.com/functions/print.php?StorylD=20040715-082643-4571 r.
103. See, e.g., DAVID KAHN, THE READER OF GENTLEMEN'S MAIL: HERBERT 0.
YARDLEY AND THE BIRTH OF AMERICAN CODEBREAKING (2004); accord Joseph C. Goul-
den, A Brave Spy, Tracking Carlos, Code Work, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2004, available at
http://www.washingtontimes.com/books/20040731-101353-6386r.htm. Kahn reproduces a Stimson
diary entry of June 3, 1931, in which he recounts halting funding for code work because diplomats 'are
supposed to deal internationally on a gentlemen's basis.'; see also, RICHARD HOLM, THE
AMERICAN AGENT: MY LIFE IN THE C.I.A. (2003); CONSTANTINE FITZGIBBON, SECRET
INTELLIGENCE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 158 (1976); Louis Kruh, Stimson, the Black
Chamber, and the 'Gentlemen's Mail' Quote, Cryptologia, Apr. 1988, at 65-83; see generally, Mark G.
Young, What Big Eyes and Ears You Have! A New Regime for Covert Governmental Surveillance, 70
FORDHAM L. REV. 1017 (2001) (examining the government's powers and citizens' liberties in the af-
termath of 9/11).
104. Electronic Frontier Foundation, EFF Analysis of the Provisions of the USA PA TRIOTAct, Oct.
31, 2001, at http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/20011031 _eff_usapatriot-analysis.html.
105. Id.
106. This section amends Title V of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §
1861 (1978).
VOL. 33:1
THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA, LAW, AND NATIONAL ...
claimed, library books. As a result, it has been observed that "Section 215 is one
of the surprising lightning rods of the Patriot Act, engendering more protest, law-
suits, and congressional amendments than any other. In part this is because this
section authorizes the government to march into a library and demand a list of eve-
ryone who's ever checked out a copy of My Secret Garden but also because those
librarians are tough.' ' 7
In fact, Section 215 contains no such provisions; indeed it specifically states
that an order requiring the production of tangible items may be issued only "if the
judge finds that the application meets the requirements of this section"',0 8 require-
ments include that the item requested be shown to be for the purpose of protecting
"against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities."' 0 9
Likewise, Section 215 of the Patriot Act is specifically entitled, "Seizure of
Voice-Mail Message pursuant to Warrants."
Interpretations of the Patriot Act appear to be undergoing a process ofjudicial
interpretation comparable to that of the aviation security regulations and laws
promulgated in the 1970's after a rash of airline hijackings linked to Cuba. In
1972, a series of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) directives ordered mag-
netometer screening and warrantless searches without probable cause of all airline
passengers.'1°
The reactions of outrage by civil libertarians to these airline regulations were
comparable to today's reactions to the Patriot Act. It was claimed that these new
regulations were a precursor to a government police state. Judge Goldberg, writing
in the Fifth Circuit case of U.S. v Legato, wrote that "[s]eeking to prevent or deter
crime, standing alone, has never justified eroding the right to privacy, and I con-
tinue to hope that we will soon return to the hallowed and halcyon days of the
Fourth Amendment."'1
Unfortunately, the civil libertarians' notion of halcyon days were rudely inter-
rupted with still more hijackings, prompting the government to justify its regula-
tions authorizing warrantless searches of airline passengers on grounds that pas-
sengers wishing to travel impliedly "consented" to the magnetometer search by
buying an airline ticket and attempting to board the aircraft.
Federal courts purporting to uphold civil libertarian principles were initially
hostile to the "consent" theory as a basis for warrantless searches without probable
107. Dahlia Lithwick & Julia Turner, A Guide to the Patriot Act, Part I: Should You Be Scared of
the Patriot Act?, JURISPRUDENCE, Sep. 8, 2003, available at http://slate.msn.com/id/2087984.
108. Title V of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (1978), § 501
(c)(1), as amended by the Patriot Act, § 215.
109. Id. § 501 (a)(1).
110. A list of these directives can be found in U.S. v. Lopez-Pages, 767 F.2d 776 (11 th Cir. 1998); a
summary of the development of FAA rules in this area can also be found at U.S. v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893
(9th Cir. 1973); see also 37 Fed. Reg. 4904-05 (Mar. 7, 1972); 37 Fed. Reg. 5689-91 (Mar. 18, 1972);
37 Fed. Reg. 7150 (Apr. 11, 1972). For a comprehensive discussion of FAA regulations in this area, see
DEMPSEY et al., AVIATION LAW AND REGULATION (1992).
111. U.S. v. Legato, 480 F.2d 408, 414 (5th Cir. 1973) (concurring opinion).
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cause.1 2 In U.S. v. Kroll, for example, the Eighth Circuit suppressed evidence
seized from an airline passenger during mandatory security screening, declaring
that a defendant's attempt to board an aircraft did not constitute consent "in any
meaningful sense:"" 
3
Compelling the defendant to choose between exercising Fourth Amendment
rights and his right to travel constitutes coercion; the government cannot be said
to have established that the defendant freely and voluntarily consented to search
when to do otherwise would have meant foregoing the constitutional right to
travel. 114
Likewise, in U.S. v. Albarado, the Second Circuit declared that:
To make one choose between flying to one's destination and exercising one's
constitutional rights appear to us, as to the Eighth Circuit, in many situations a
form of coercion, however subtle. While it may be argued that there are often
other forms of transportation available, it would work a considerable hardship on
many air travelers to be forced to utilize an alternative form of transportation.
1 15
In the aftermath of continued threats to the safety of passengers, however, it
soon became clear that strict interpretations of the Fourth Amendment, must of ne-
cessity, give way to real concerns for the safety of passengers. However, it was not
until Judge Friendly in U.S. v. Edwards adopted the "danger alone" test" 16 for up-
holding warrantless searches without probable cause at airport security checkpoints
that the tide of federal court opinions shifted toward upholding magnetometer
searches.
Although civil libertarians continue to express their abhorrence of warrantless
searches at airports, such security searches are today recognized and accepted by
the general public as a necessary precaution against hijacking; indeed one might
question how many passengers today would be willing to embark on an aircraft
knowing that a hijacker with deadly weapons could freely embark on the same air-
craft without any search of his person or baggage.
Although perceptions might differ as to whether today's routine airport
searches constitute the tyrannical police state envisioned by the civil libertarians,
one airline executive has expressed surprise that such warrantless searches were so
readily accepted by the traveling public:
It seems ironic that we find ourselves in a situation where each and every air
traveler in the United States is treated as a suspect as soon as he enters an airline
terminal. It would seem ironic to the citizen of 1937 that air travelers today not
only submit willingly to searches of their person and carryon baggage, but actu-
ally laud the virtues of and need for such action. "1
7
112. U.S. v. Kroll, 481 F.2d 884 (8th Cir. 1973).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. U.S. v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 806-07 (2d Cir. 1973).
116. U.S. v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1974).
117. M.J. Fenello, Individual Rights v. Skyjack Deterrence: An Airline Man's View, 18 VILL. L.
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In the same way that searches and security procedures which constitute mod-
est inconveniences to the public were accepted in the aftermath of serious threats
to the safety of airline passengers, the willingness of the public to accept similar
inconveniences in order to provide security against attacks of the type initiated by
enemy force on 9/11 is reflected in the overwhelming vote in Congress for the Pa-
triot Act." 8
C. International and Domestic Law Relating to the Rights of Detainees Cap-
tured in the War on Terror
Since 9/11, a number of new legal issues have arisen concerning the jurisdic-
tion of military courts,' 9 material witness detentions, 120 access to counsel" 2 and
discovery of sensitive information.
22
The most contentious of these issues includes the rights of the detainees held
at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 123 In particular, questions have been raised about the
rights of prisoners detained outside the territory of the United States to invoke ha-
beas corpus relief in the federal courts. This, in turn presents a narrow question of
the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts.
The applicable statutory authority is 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which states, "Writs of
habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the dis-
trict courts and any circuit court judge within their respective jurisdictions."' 
24
This statute also specifically provides that any "order of a circuit judge shall be en-
tered in the district court of the district where the restraint complained of is
had. ,,125
In the case of the Guantanamo detainees, it is not disputed that detainees are
being restrained in Guantanamo, Cuba, and a cursory look at any map shows that
Cuba is not located within the territorial jurisdiction of any federal court of the
United States. In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear that
REV. 996 (1973).
118. Brian Wilson, Ashcroft to Launch Patriot Tour, Fox NEWS (Aug. 14, 2003), at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0%2C2933%2C94668%2C00.html. "Congress overwhelmingly passed
the Patriot Act in the weeks following the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks. The Senate voted 98-1, the
House 357-66. The new measures give law enforcement enhanced tools to fight the war against terror-
ism." Id.
119. E.g., Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
120. E.g.,In re The Application of the U.S. for a Material Witness Warrant, 213 F.Supp.2d 287
(S.D.N.Y. 2002).
121. E.g. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cit. 2002) vacated by 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004)
122. E.g. U.S. v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004).
123. See The Prisoners at Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2002, at A18 (opining that disturb-
ing reports have been given regarding the treatment of the prisoners at Guantanamo Bay and concern of
the humane treatment of prisoners under military conditions.); see also, Gordon Tagge, Letter to the
Editor, The Conditions at Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2002, at A26 (describing reports of pris-
oners' quarters being bug infested and horrible means); see also Katherine Q. Seelye, On Defensive,
General Says Prisoners Get Mats, Even Bagels, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2002, at A16 (stating that the
amount of prisoners is growing faster than the ability to quarantine them from each other and facility
development).
124. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (a) (2004) (emphasis added).
125. Id. (emphasis added).
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"[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power
authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial de-
cree. It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction .... 26
Although the meaning of these statutes appears plain on their face, the U.S.
Supreme Court had occasion to interpret their meaning in three seminal cases:
Ahrens v.. Clark,127 Johnson v. Eisentrager,128 and Braden v. 3 0 1h Judicial Circuit
Court of Kentucky.1
29
In Ahrens, the court dismissed the habeas petitions of detainees held on Ellis
Island because the detainees filed their petitions in the District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia rather than the district in which they were being detained,"30 a
clear violation of 28 U.S.C. § 2241,'3' which states that a habeas petition must be
filed in the district where the detainees are being held.
In Eisentrager, alien detainees imprisoned in a U.S.-controlled prison in
Germany filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus in the District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia.' 32 Again, the Supreme Court dismissed these petitions on
grounds that Germany, where the prisoners were being detained, was not within
the territorial jurisdiction of any federal court: 1
33
Nothing in the text of the Constitution extends such a right, nor does anything in
our statutes .... These prisoners at no relevant time were within any territory
over which the United States is sovereign, and the scenes of their offense, their
capture, their trial and their punishment were all beyond the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the United States. 1
34
In Braden, a prisoner who was the subject of a detainer order in Kentucky, but
actually held in physical custody in Alabama, filed a habeas corpus petition in
Kentucky. 135 The Supreme Court in that case modestly broadened the definition of
"custody" under the statute to include a territory within the United States in which
the prisoners had been the subject of a detainer order even though the detainee was
not being physically held in that jurisdiction. 3 6 This case did not even mention
Eisentrager, since both Kentucky and Alabama are within the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the United States.
126. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (emphasis added).
127. Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948).
128. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
129. Braden v. 3 0 'h Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484 (1973).
130. Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 189.
131. In 1948, the statutory precursor of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2004) was 28 U.S.C. § 452 (1948).
132. Johnson, 339 U.S. at 765.
133. With regard to the extent of military court jurisdiction, see Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341
(1952); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); Ex parte Quirin v. Cox, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); Ex parte
Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866); Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. 243 (1863); Hammond v. Squier, 51 F.
Supp. 227 (W.D. Wash. 1943); In re Egan, 8 F. Cas. 367 (N.D.N.Y 1866) (No. 4303).
134. Johnson, 339 U.S. at 768, 777-778 (emphasis added).
135. Braden, 410 U.S. at 485.
136. See Id.
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Finally, in Rasul v. Bush,'37 the U.S. Supreme Court considered a case virtu-
ally indistinguishable on its facts from the facts in Eisentrager-that is, a case in-
volving habeas corpus petitions filed by alien detainees held in custody in a coun-
try outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.138 Nevertheless, the
court purported to find the following differences in the facts in Rasul: 1) the peti-
tioners in Rasul were not nationals of countries at war with the United States, and
2) they were imprisoned in territory over which the United States exercises exclu-
sive jurisdiction and control.139 These purported significant distinctions are curi-
ous, since at the time the petitioners in Eisentrager filed their petitions, the United
States was not at war with Germany, and the prison in which the petitioners were
being held in Germany was, like Guantanamo, also within the exclusive control of
U.S. authorities. 1
40
Certainly reasonable arguments might be made before Congress to amend 28
U.S.C. § 2241 to authorize the extension of U.S. judicial power beyond the
boundaries of the United States. Although such a course might be questionable
under applicable provisions of international law and serve to confirm suspicions by
many around the world that the United States seeks to extend its hegemony and
project its jurisdiction beyond its territorial limits, such an amendment by Congress
would at least provide a domestic legislative basis for extending the subject matter
jurisdiction of U.S. courts.
In Rasul, however, the court chose not to defer to the legislative branch of
government in this regard but rather chose to do precisely what it had previously
forbidden-namely, to expand the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts
"by judicial decree." 14 '
Alarmingly, the Court even declined to overrule Eisentrager, presumably to
avoid the task of having to justify taking the extraordinary step of disregarding its
own clear legal precedent. Instead, it purported to find that since Braden modestly
expanded the legal definition of "custody" to permit a petitioner in physical cus-
tody in one jurisdiction in the United States to file a habeas writ in another juris-
diction within the United States where the petitioner was under a legal order of de-
tention, 14  neither Ahrens nor Eisentrager can be viewed as establishing "an
137. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
138. Id. at 2686-91.
139. Id. at 2693. The other two factual distinctions given by the court were that the petitioners in
Rasul had not been afforded access to any tribunal, and that they denied being guilty of any grounds for
detention. However, the court in Rasul never explained how the underlying merits of a case had any
bearing on the underlying subject matter jurisdiction of the courts. Moreover, although it is true that the
court in Eisentrager made no mention of what alternative courts were made available to German pris-
oners of war; it is highly unlikely that a significant percentage of the over one million prisoners of war
in Germany were given trials in military courts. It may also be presumed that the petitioners in Eisen-
trager also would have claimed grounds which would entitle them to release; otherwise there would
have been little point in filing their habeas petitions.
140. Id.
141. See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377.
142. Id.
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inflexible jurisdictional rule"'143 that precludes detainees outside of the United
States from filing a habeas petition in U.S. courts. 144 This holding is all the more
remarkable in that Braden never even referred to Eisentrager.
The holding in Rasul is already raising some alarming questions. For exam-
ple, if the power of the U.S. courts is determined not by territorial limits of sover-
eignty, but rather by the exercise of "complete jurisdiction and control over and
within said areas," 14 1 would this mean that an Osama bin Laden, cornered in a cave
in an area of Afghanistan controlled by U.S. forces, would have a right under the
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution to demand that U.S. forces first obtain
a search warrant before entering his cave? What appeared to be a silly question un-
der Eisentrager suddenly becomes pointed after Rasul. As the Chief Justice noted,
"since 'jurisdiction and control' obtained through a lease is no different in effect
from 'jurisdiction and control' acquired by lawful force of arms, parts of Afghani-
stan and Iraq should logically be regarded as subject to our domestic laws,"' 46 in-
cluding presumably the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
In a vigorous dissenting opinion in Rasul,147 Justice Scalia noted one of the
dire warnings set forth by the court in Eisentrager:
To grant the writ of these prisoners might mean our army must transport them
across the seas for a hearing. This would require allocation for shipping space,
guarding personnel billeting and rations .... The writ since it is held to be a
matter of right would be equally available to enemies during active hostilities as
in the present twilight between war and peace. Such trials would hamper the war
effort .... It would be difficult to devise more effective fettering of a field
commander than to allow the very enemies he is ordered to reduce to submission
to call him to account in his own civil courts and divert his effort and attention
from the military offensive abroad to the legal defensive at home. 1
48
The spectacle of a General Eisenhower having to return to the United States
to defend a civil action brought against him by one of two million German prison-
ers of war in Germany, or that of an Osama bin Laden suing his military captors in
a U.S. court in Washington D.C., is perhaps bizarre, but a very real possibility un-
der the ill-considered majority opinion in Rasul.
Justice Scalia remarked on this omission in his dissenting opinion:
The consequence of holding, as applied to aliens outside the country, is breath-
taking. It permits an alien capture in a foreign theater of active combat to bring a
(28 U.S.C.) 2241 petition against the Secretary of Defense. Over the course of
the last century, the United States has held millions of alien prisoners abroad. (In
World War II) U.S. forces had in custody approximately two million enemy sol-
143. Id.
144. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2691.
145. Id. (citing the terms of the U.S. lease of Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba).
146. Id.
147. The dissenting opinion in Rasul, was written by Justice Scalia, with whom the Chief Justice
and Justice Thomas joined.
148. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2707 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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diers. A great many of these prisoners no doubt would have complained about
the circumstances of their capture and the terms of their confinement.1
49
It is difficult not to conclude that Rasul represents the exercise of raw judicial
power for the purpose of usurping the legislative power of the people in direct vio-
lation of the principle of separation of powers. Journalists and media pundits may
not understand the distinction between rights and jurisdiction, but surely the same
cannot be said of members of the U.S. Supreme Court. Although the popular media
no doubt placed pressure on the Supreme Court to rule the way it did, it is doubtful
if Rasul's extraordinary judicial extension of U.S. judicial power, beyond the terri-
tory of the United States, will have any measurable effect on the ultimate rights of
detainees; indeed, it may well serve to further confirm the suspicions of many
around the world that the United States seeks to expand its hegemony and project
its jurisdiction beyond its own territory into that of its neighbors. 150 Rather, Con-
gress should by statute establish meaningful provision for the fair and civil treat-
ment of all detainees in U.S. custody, including a requirement that any detainee's
status be determined by a military court within a specific period of time.
D. The Role of National Resolve
When attacked, democratic nations are heavily dependent on the support and
resolve of their people to mount a credible defense. A bare majority is rarely suffi-
cient to enable a democratic nation to prosecute a war to a successful conclusion.
Under rules of the U.S. Senate, a minority of senators can block spending bills
through a variety of procedural tools, such as the filibuster; a yellow or sensation-
alist press can divulge information useful to an attacking enemy, encourage an en-
emy to press its attack on American soldiers more zealously, or vilify its own na-
tional leaders.
Although many think of World War II as a war fought with the overwhelming
support of the American people, it should be recalled that until the attack on Pearl
Harbor in 1941 there was considerable debate over whether to go to war with
Germany"' ! and massive anti-war demonstrations were staged in such public ven-
149. Id. (Scalia J., dissenting).
150. The exercise of military jurisdiction as a necessary incident of the laws of war is widely rec-
ognized; the imposition of civil jurisdiction, on the other hand, suggests political hegemony which is
recognized as a greater threat to the sovereignty of an occupied territory.
151. See, e.g., Adam J. Berinsky, American public Opinion and World War II: A Research Agenda
and some Preliminary Findings, 6 ( 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://web.mit.edu/berinsky/www/APO.pdf; see generally, WAYNE S. COLE, CHARLES A.
LINDBERGH AND THE BATTLE AGAINST AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WORLD WAR II
(1974); CHARLES BEARD, THE DEVIL THEORY OF WAR 107-24 (1936); The Neutrality Act of
1937, 49 Stat. 1081; Franklin D. Roosevelt, Four Freedoms speech, The Public Papers of Franklin D.
Roosevelt 663-73 (Jan. 6, 1941); Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat on National Defense, The Public
Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt 384-89 (Sept. 11, 1941); America First Committee Charges Roosevelt
with Fighting a One-Man War, Did You Know? (Am. First Comm.), Sept. 13, 1941, at 1, 5 (Lindbergh
representing the majority of the nonintervention viewpoint); JUSTUS DOENECKE, ANTI-
INTERVENTION: A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION TO ISOLATIONISM AND
PACIFISM FROM WORLD WAR I TO THE EARLY COLD WAR (1987) (General bibliography at
http://www.onpower.org/foreign_non_inter.html); but see Bear F. Braumoeller, The Myth of American
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ues as Madison Square Gardens. 152 Even after Pearl Harbor, there was opposition
in Congress to declaring war on either Japan or Germany.
153
It must also be recalled that what appears to be massive public support for go-
ing to war can quickly dissolve once military setbacks and difficulties are encoun-
tered and the media can play a large role in undermining national resolve to prose-
cute a war to a successful conclusion. At the outset of the Civil War in 1861, for
example, there was overwhelming support in the North to go to war with the South
to preserve the Union. After several years of military setbacks at the hands of the
Confederacy, however, much of the news media in the North began both to vilify
the national leaders who were leading the war effort and to question the expendi-
ture of lives and national treasure on a war to free slaves.' 54 This vilification led
President Lincoln to conclude that he could not be reelected in 1864.55 Indeed,
Lincoln resolved that he would have to win the war prior to the inauguration of a
new president since he assumed that whoever beat him in the election would have
done so on terms that would prevent the new president from winning the war
Isolationism (2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/-bfbraum/MythOfUSIsol.pdf (representing the counter argument to
U.S. isolationism before Pearl Harbor).
152. See COLE, supra note 151; accord Charles Lindbergh, Speech Delivered in New York City
(Apr. 23, 1941), available at http://www.charleslindbergh.com/americanfirst/speech2.asp; Charles
Lindbergh, Election Promises Should Be Kept We Lack Leadership that Places America First, Deliv-
ered in New York City, Madison Square Garden ( May 23 1941), available at
http://www.charleslindbergh.com/pdf/speech7.pdf; see generally Douglas Charles, Informing FDR: FBI
Political Surveillance and the Isolationist-Interventionist Foreign Policy Debate, 1939-1945, 24 Dip-
lomatic History 211 (2000); cf Hartzel v. U.S., 322 U.S. 680 (1944) (reversing a conviction under the
Espionage Act of June 15, 1917); but see Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("The most stringent
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a
panic."); U.S. v. Hartzel, 138 F.2d 169 (7th Cir. 1943).
153. Charles Lutton, Pearl Harbor: Fifty Years of Controversy, 11 J. OF HIST. REV. 431, 467
(1991), available at http://www.ihr.org/jhr/vll/vllp431Lutton.html. President Roosevelt commis-
sioned an investigation into the Pearl Harbor attacks following the incident. The committee, led by As-
sociate Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts, submitted its report on January 23, 1942. See also S.
REP. NO. 79-244, at 493 (1946), available at http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/congress/minority.html
(entire transcript of the minority report filed in opposition to the above committee's findings that further
justified America's entering WWII against Japan and Germany).
154. Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address reiterates at length the purpose of the War and the need
to overcome for the sake of blacks:
Neither party expected for the war the magnitude of the duration which it has already at-
tained. Neither anticipated that the cause of the conflict might cease with or even before
the conflict itself should cease.
With malice toward none, with charity, for all, with firmness in the right as God gives us to
see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in, to bind up the nation's wounds,
to care for him who shall have bome the battle and for his widow and his orphan, to do all
which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among ourselves and with all na-
tions.
Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1965), reprinted in CHRISTOPHER WALDREP
& LYNNE CURRY, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NATION: THE CIVIL WAR AND
AMERICAN CONSTITUIONALISM 140-42 (2003). See also CARL SANDBURG, ABRAHAM
LINCOLN: THE PRARIE YEARS AND THE WAR YEARS (1954).
155. JOHN C. WAUGH, REFLECTING LINCOLN: THE BATTLE FOR THE 1864 PRESIDENCY (2001).
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thereafter. 5 6 Only a timely capture of Atlanta by General Sherman in the waning
days of 1864 strengthened national resolve and secured President Lincoln's reelec-
tion.
One hundred and forty years later, President Bush has experienced similar
circumstances. In September of 2002, the Los Angeles Times reported a poll that
showed that "[b]y a margin of more than three to one (76 percent to 23 percent)
Americans said they think the United States should take military action to remove
Hussein from power .... Nearly eight in 10 say they believe Hussein has sup-
ported Al Qaeda's terrorist activities" 157 (a belief later confirmed by the findings of
a federal court in Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan).1 58 By the eve of the
2004 Presidential election, a series of setbacks in Iraq and a relentless media bar-
rage had reduced the margin of public support considerably. 159 It remains to be
seen whether a success in Iraq comparable to Sherman's capture of Atlanta can re-
establish public support to the point where the war on terror can be prosecuted to a
successful conclusion.
IV. CONCLUSION
U.N. Resolution 1441 has provided a firm foundation for the prosecution of
the allied war on terror in Iraq. Domestic terrorism laws, such as the Patriot Act,
while yet to be fully tested in the courts, have their foundation in investigative pro-
cedures already tested by the courts. Although the overwhelming support for the
war on terror and the war against Iraq has diminished considerably in the aftermath
156. Id. at 543 (quoting a letter written by President Lincoln in 1864):
This morning, as for some days past, it seems exceedingly probable that this Administra-
tion will not be re-elected. Then it will be my duty to co-operate with the President elect,
as to save the Union between the election and the inauguration; as he will have secured his
election on such ground that he can not possibly save it afterwards.
157. See e.g., Sonni Efron, Across Nation, Critics of Bush Express Support for Iraq War, L.A.
TIMES, Sep. 15, 2002, at A14.
158. Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 262 F. Supp. 2d. 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
159. "President George W. Bush's job performance rating has slipped to 53% positive, his lowest
since the terrorist attacks in 2001, according to a poll of 1,004 likely U.S. voters by Zogby Interna-
tional. His negative rating reached 46%, just under his pre-9/1 I unfavorable of 49%" Bush Job Per-
formance, Zogby International, (July 18, 2003), available at
http://www.zogby.com/news/ReadNews.dbm?ID=7
2 1; but see The Pew Research Center for the People
and the Press, Part Five: Opinion About the Bush Administration's Stewardship, available at
http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?PagelD=
8 67) (last visited Feb. 6, 2005) [hereinafter Pew
Poll].
But Bush's handling of the situation in Iraq, and his foreign policy in general, continue to
receive more negative reactions from the public. Just 42% approve of Bush's overall han-
dling of foreign policy and roughly the same number (43%) approve of the way he is han-
dling the war in Iraq. Bush's ratings on Iraq, like his measures on terrorism, have been
fairly consistent over the past few months. And when it comes to how the president has
handled international trade issues, just one-in-three approve, with 45% disapproving and a
relatively high number (22%) declining to offer an opinion. Pew Poll, supra note 159.
"Forty-four percent (44%) of Americans now give the President good or excellent marks for his han-
dling of the situation in Iraq. An identical number say he is doing a poor job in this area." Rasmussen
Reports, 44% Rate Bush Good/Excellent on Iraq: Another 44% Give the President Poor Marks, Dec. 8,
2004, available at http://www.rasmussenreports.com/War/20with/201raq*20Bush*20Ratings.htm.
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of extensive and negative media coverage, national resolve in the face of setbacks
can provide the foundation for securing the peace through enforcement of interna-
tional law.
